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DECENTRALIZING CRIME CONTROL: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 
Doron Teichman* 
INT RODUCTION 
In an article recently published on the pages of this Law Review, The 
Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional 
Competition ("The Market"),1 I put forward a theory of crime control in a 
decentralized government. Specifically, I made three distinct claims. First, 
criminal justice policies affect the geographic decision of criminals as to 
where to commit their crimes. 2 Other things being equal, criminal activity 
will tend to shift to areas in which the expected sanction is lower. Second, 
local jurisdictions attempting to lower their crime rates will react to policies 
adopted by neighboring jurisdictions and try to keep up with their 
neighbors' sanctioning levels.3 In other words, the optimal expected sanction 
for a certain jurisdiction cannot be derived from the characteristics of that 
jurisdiction alone; it must incorporate the expected sanctions of neighboring 
jurisdictions.4 Third, competition among local jurisdictions in the area of 
criminal justice could be both efficient (a race to the top) and inefficient (a 
race to the bottom) depending on the specific context over which jurisdic-
• 
• 5 t10ns are competmg. 
In three insightful comments, Professors Rachel Barkow, Sam Gross, 
and Wayne Logan deepen and broaden the discussion I attempted to start in 
The Market.6 They flesh out in great detail some of the theoretical complexi­
ties and practical difficulties regarding the competitive forces driving 
criminal justice policies that I did not fully treat in The Market. Further, they 
demonstrate that we should use great caution before adopting any policy 
recommendations based on the insights of The Market. The comments 
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University; LL.M. 2002, S.J.D. 2004, University of Michigan. -Ed. I would like to thank Rachel 
Barkow, Sam Gross, and Wayne Logan for their contributions to this correspondence. For helpful 
comments I thank Ronen Avraham, Omri Ben-Shahar, and Ronald Mann. 
1. Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and 
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1831 (2005). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. In this regard I parted from the classic economic analysis of crime control as presented in 
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
5. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1858-64. 
6. Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1713 
(2006); Samuel R. Gross, Jurisdictional Competition in Criminal Justice: How Much Does It Really 
Happen?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1725 (2006); Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals, and Competitive 
Crime Control, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1733 (2006). 
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clearly help a great deal to understand the issues at hand; one should not 
read The Market without reading this correspondence. 
My goals in this short Reply are twofold. On one hand, I will answer 
some of the criticisms leveled against the arguments made in The Market. 
Obviously, due to the constraints of this format, I cannot answer every point 
made by the commentators, so I will focus my remarks on the main areas of 
disagreement. On the other hand, I will try to build on the comments to ex­
tend my initial analysis. The Reply is divided into two parts. In the first, I 
shall deal with the existence of competition in the area of criminal justice 
and defend my claim that competition affects the design of criminal justice 
polices in a decentralized government. In the second, I will tum to the pol­
icy implications of my claims and argue that The Market offers constructive 
policy recommendations for any decentralized criminal justice system, in­
cluding the United States. 
I. THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM 
In The Market I argued that competition in the area of criminal justice 
could potentially lead to a race to the top or a race to the bottom. The focus 
of all three comments published here is on the potential problem-namely, 
the race to the bottom. Yet at the outset I would like to point out that in The 
Market I spoke of a potential race to the bottom and emphasized the benefits 
of jurisdictional competition in the area of criminal justice.7 Competition 
might drive local governments to innovate and adopt efficient crime control 
measures. In addition, decentralization could allow criminal laws to be tai­
lored to the sensitive preferences of local communities. Furthermore, there 
might be organizational inefficiencies associated with creating large national 
agencies that can be avoided by creating small local agencies. Finally, there 
might be informational advantages to relying on local rather than national 
systems. Thus, while this Reply will focus on the potential race to the bot­
tom, the reader should note that that race is only one possible factor to be 
weighed in determining crime policy. 
The commentators express skepticism as to the existence of competition 
with respect to criminal justice. Gross, for example, argues that there might 
not even be a question of a race to the top or a race to the bottom for the 
simple reason that there is no race to begin with.8 Gross's skepticism arises 
from the lack of empirical data supporting the competition hypothesis. This 
concern is legitimate, and that is why the claims made in The Market were 
tentative, pending further empirical research. But Gross does more: he pre­
sents data that supposedly suggest that competition does not play an 
important role in the area of criminal sanctions.9 Yet a close evaluation dem­
onstrates that the data he presents cannot rebut the competition hypothesis. 
For instance, Gross points out that between the years 1980 and 2001, while 
7. Teichman, supra note I, at 1858-64. 
8. Gross, supra note 6, at 1732. 
9. Id. at 1730-32. 
June 2006) Decentralizing Crime Control 1751 
the drug related state prison population rose by a factor of thirteen, the fed­
eral drug related prison population rose by a factor of sixteen. 10 According 
to Gross, since the federal government is not part of the jurisdictional race, 
the fact that its sanctions rose faster than state sanctions falsifies the compe­
tition hypothesis.11 This claim is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, I am 
not sure that the federal government is not functioning in a competitive set­
ting in the area of drug crimes. Drug crimes in the United States are part of 
an international market for drugs, and from that perspective it might be the 
case that the United States is attempting to place itself as a country in which 
the cost of committing crimes is high. If, for example, the United States 
manages to confiscate twice as many drugs as Canada, a drug exporter in 
South America might decide to focus his activity on the Canadian market 
rather than on the American market. Secondly, and perhaps more impor­
tantly, as Barkow clearly described in her reply, the politics of criminal law 
at the state and federal level are not identical. 12 Thus, simply presenting the 
raw numbers (as is done in Gross's response) does not explain the causation 
behind the numbers. I do not claim to present a rigorous statistical analysis 
here, but it might well be the case that displacement was a driving force at 
the state level, while other political forces were active on the federal level. 
If, for example, the decision rule of federal legislatures in the area of crimi­
nal law is "copy all state legislation and make it a little tougher"-and 
Barkow's analysis seems to indicate that that is a distinct possibility-one 
would expect to see the exact statistical picture Gross presents. Everything 
else isn't equal and thus we simply cannot draw the conclusions that Gross 
would like us to draw from the evidence he presents. 13 
Gross's skepticism as to the competition hypothesis also rests on a rejec­
tion of the underlying assumptions as to the behavior of criminals. As he puts 
it, ''[i]t's hard to imagine that black crack users from Cleveland have re­
sponded to the policy of the Cuyahoga County prosecutor by driving over the 
border [and] smoking crack in the nearly all-white suburbs . .. .  " 14 Even with­
out conducting extensive empirical research one has to concede that this 
observation must be true in a large number of cases. Yet as the commentators 
10. Id. at 1731. 
11. Id. Gross also points out that from 1980 through 2001 the total population of prisoners in 
state custody increased by about 300% while the population of prisoners in federal custody grew by 
630%. Id. 
12. Barkow, supra note 6, at 1720-22. 
13. To some degree, Barkow makes the same mistake that Gross does when she argues that 
the fact that the federal government set minimal standards for sex offender registration and notifica­
tion leads to the conclusion that there is no race in this context between the states. See id. at 1722-
23. While this fact might demonstrate that the federal government is a poor regulator of the states in 
this area due to the political forces active in Congress, it does not demonstrate that competition did 
not drive state legislation in the area. Competition might drive state legislation in the area, while 
other political forces might drive Congress to enact even tougher laws. The causation is simply 
unclear. 
14. Gross, supra note 6, at 1727-28. 
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acknowledge, some displacement clearly cannot be ruled out;15 likewise, the 
possibility that the perception of displacement is driving policies cannot be 
ruled out.16 That is an empirical question, and aside from citing anecdotes 
supporting our positions, not much can be done at this point in time.17 What 
I would like to emphasize here is that at least one competitive force I de­
scribed in The Market requires no assumptions as to the mobility of 
criminals: the force of competition for capital investments.18 If criminals are 
completely immobile, but capital is mobile and tends to shift to jurisdictions 
in which the crime"rate is lower,19 then the competition for capital invest­
ments will drive the harshening of the criminal justice system.20 To draw on 
Gross's hypothetical, a criminal in Cleveland might not move to Seattle be­
cause of a lower expected sanction, but a multinational corporation might 
decide to invest in Seattle rather than in Cleveland because of lower crime 
rates created by higher expected sanctions. 
Finally, Logan also raises doubts as to the validity of the competition 
hypothesis due to the large scope of interstate reliance in the area of crimi­
nal justice. Logan points out that a sizeable number of jurisdictions (sixteen) 
adopted the external approach with respect to the registration requirement of 
their Sex Offender Registration and Notification Law (SORNL).21  Logan 
notes many negative consequences that arise from the use of the external 
approach.22 I am not sure why this evidence is contrary to my assertion. The 
fact that so many jurisdictions adopted the external approach supports the 
competition hypothesis. The very content of those laws demonstrates that 
legislatures are concerned about sex offender migration when enacting 
SORNLs. In other words, a state cannot design its optimal SORNL without 
taking into account the equivalent legislation of other states. That is pre­
cisely the positive claim I made in The Market. 
15. Barkow, supra note 6, at 1723; Gross, supra note 6, at 1725. 
16. Barkow, supra note 6, at 1720. 
17. Measuring crime displacement empirically is an extraordinarily difficult task. The initial 
theoretical contribution in the area of geographic displacement caused by crime control efforts was 
made in Thomas A. Reppetto, Crime Prevention and the Displacement Phenomenon, 22 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 166 (1976). Until recently, not a single published study has evaluated displacement di­
rectly. Rather, studies dealing with other issues have incidentally reported on displacement. See 
David Weisburd et al., Does Crime Just Move Around the Comer?: A Controlled Study of Spatial 
Displacement and Diffusion of Crime Control Benefits in Two Crime Hot Spots, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 
(forthcoming Aug. 2006) (reviewing the literature and presenting the first such study). 
18. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1838. 
19. This is not to say that such an assumption is doubt-free. Crime's effects on both real 
estate and labor markets could cause places with higher crime rates to actually become attractive for 
investors. The reduction of real estate prices brought about by higher crime rates could lower costs 
for investors. In addition, higher crime rates might indicate the presence of a large labor force will­
ing to work for relatively low wages. 
20. See Nicolas Marceau, Competition in Crime Deterrence, 30 CAN. J. EcoN. 844, 851-53 
(1997). 
21. Logan, supra note 6, at 1736. 
22. Id. at 1737-45. 
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While I disagree with the comments' denial of the very existence of 
competition, the comments nonetheless help flesh out some of the nuances 
of competition in criminal justice that I did not pay full attention to in The 
Market. Gross, for example, points out that interjurisdictional differences 
can arise out of the way prosecutorial discretion is applied.23 Given the fact 
that in the United States prosecutors hold tremendous discretion and power 
over the sanctioning process, it could very well be the case that a significant 
part of the effect of jurisdictional competition occurs in that area. To illus­
trate, think of the choice faced by a prosecutor who--due to a budget 
constraint-can only prosecute one of two criminals who committed identi­
cal crimes. The first is a local teenager, and the second is a teenager from 
the neighboring poor suburb. Suppose that there exists a relatively large pool 
of potential criminals who might come into the jurisdiction to commit their 
crimes from the poor suburb, while crimes committed by locals are rare 
events. The prosecutor might choose to invest his limited resources in prose­
cuting the out-of-town criminal in order to send a message to criminals in 
neighboring jurisdictions that they should take their business elsewhere. 
The comments also help one understand how legislative competition is 
triggered. As Gross and Barkow point out, displacement was only an unin­
tended consequence of California's three-strikes law.24 Barkow continues by 
outlining the alternative political forces that drive the enactment of new 
criminal legislation. 25 I completely agree with this analysis. As the evidence 
cited in The Market shows, California did not anticipate the displacement 
effect of its three-strikes legislation prior to enacting it.26 This was probably 
also the case with respect to other examples I analyzed in The Market, such 
as SORNLs and laws limiting the sale of pseudoephedrine. The original 
pieces of legislation-enacted in New Jersey and Oklahoma, respectively­
probably had little to do with an intentional crime displacement plan and 
much more to do with the public outcry caused by two especially heinous 
crimes.2 7  Nonetheless, an interesting question remains: what do such "legis­
lative shocks" cause once they are enacted? In many cases, innovation stems 
from unintended consequences. A drug manufacturer developing a drug 
aimed at treating cardiac diseases might unintentionally develop a drug that 
23. Gross, supra note 6, at 1727. 
24. Id. at 1730; see Barkow, supra note 6, at 1716-18. 
25. Barkow, supra note, 6 at 1718. 
26. Teichman, supra note 1, at 1847. 
27. New Jersey enacted its SORNL after the brutal rape and murder of Megan Kanka by a 
neighbor who was a convicted sex offender. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 
1997) (describing how SORNLs spread to forty-nine states following the murder). Oklahoma en­
acted a law limiting the sale of pseudoephedrine, a key ingredient in the production of the drug 
methamphetamine, after a state trooper was murdered by someone under the influence of the drug. 
See Matthew Hathaway, Authorities Here Push Plan to Fight Meth by Curbing Sale of Cold Pills, 
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 29, 2004, at A I. 
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treats erectile disorders.28 This new (unintended) drug will be produced by 
that manufacturer and copied by other manufacturers, just like any drug that 
was created intentionally. Similarly, while California might not have 
adopted its three-strikes law in order to displace crime, its continued (costly) 
application in California, and its dissemination to other states, can be ex­
plained by its unintended consequence. Furthermore, to the extent that this 
dynamic process-heinous crime followed by public outcry, legal reform in 
one state, displacement, and legal reform in neighboring states-is driving 
criminal legislation, it implies that a long-term steady equilibrium might not 
be a feasible option in the market for criminal justice. Heinous crimes that 
shock the public are as sure a thing as death and taxes. Thus, the system will 
find it difficult to stabilize in a long-term equilibrium. 
Barkow, in her comment, helps flesh out yet another complexity of com­
petition in criminal justice. As she notes, governments generally wish to 
maintain an internally rational criminal code.29 Thus, even if theft were totally 
displaceable, and murder were completely undispalceable, governments 
would still maintain a higher sanction for murder since the criminal code re­
flects a type of moral menu of a community. I agree with this claim, yet I do 
not necessarily agree with Barkow's conclusion that the effect of competition 
on raising sanctions is limited since the set of displaceable crimes is very 
small. The rational menu argument cuts both ways because the need to 
maintain internal rationality might cause a trickling effect from displaceable 
crimes into the entire criminal code. In this process, sanctions for displace­
able crimes might rise because of competitive pressures, and then the rest of 
the code might adjust upwards in order to sustain internal rationality. Thus, 
we will observe an escalation in criminal sanctions in general, not only in 
those that deal with displaceable crimes.30 
A final point, which may be a tangential step from the comments, has to 
do with the deeper social meaning of jurisdictional competition. Gross 
opens his comment by citing stories from Huckleberry Finn and Unforgiven 
about driving the bad guy out of town.31 These anecdotal stories might re­
flect the role that jurisdictional competition and crime displacement play in 
structuring the way people think and feel about crime control. People might 
not consciously think in terms of displacing crime, but after so many books, 
movies, and plays describe crime displacement as a solution to crime prob­
lems, they might simply perceive crime as something that needs to be 
displaced. If this is the case, displacement could very well be yet another 
28. Consider the story behind the development of the blockbuster drug Viagra. See Dennis 
Fernandez & Mary Chow, Intellectual Property Strategy in Bioinformatics and Biochips, 85 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 465, 468 (2003). 
29. Barkow, supra note 6, at 1721. 
30. The possibility mentioned in the text is rather bad news for empirical studies aimed at 
testing the competition hypothesis. One plausible empirical test would be to compare trends in sanc­
tions in displaceable and undisplaceable crimes over time. To the extent that the sanctions for 
displaceable crimes tend to rise faster, that would support the competition hypothesis. Yet since the 
two variables might be connected, designing such a test might be difficult. 
3 1. Gross, supra note 6, at 1725. 
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elephant hiding in the room of American criminal justice. Notice that this 
also leads to the conclusion that the effects of displacement might be well 
beyond displaceable crimes. A jurisdiction might adopt a harsh three-strikes 
law in order to send a general message to the public: "don't mess with our 
jurisdiction." This would be an especially likely strategy with high-profile 
legislation that tends to focus public attention. As Barkow points out, sym­
bolism plays an important role in the structuring of American criminal law.32 
But the question remains: what exactly are jurisdictions symbolizing when 
they enact tough criminal laws? 
In sum, the competition hypothesis comes out of this correspondence 
alive and even strengthened. In a decentralized government, jurisdictions 
take into account the policies of neighboring jurisdictions when designing 
key elements of their criminal justice system. Yet as the short discussion 
demonstrates, this competition involves different social forces, and there is 
much more work to be done before we fully understand it. 
II. THE SOLUTIONS 
So there's a race, and it might even be to the bottom; but what (if any­
thing) do we do about it? One possible solution I suggested in The Market 
was the use of central planners that will regulate the behavior of local play­
ers by, say, setting maximal sanctions for local jurisdictions.33 This implies 
that in the American setting additional federal regulation in the area of crime 
control might be desirable.34 The commentators oppose this conclusion and 
argue that federal involvement in the area is undesirable.35 Before turning to 
deal with the replies in detail, I would like to make two preliminary com­
ments. First, as I noted in The Market, additional federal regulation is 
desirable only if this regulation will fulfill the role of a rational central plan­
ner. The few examples I analyzed in The Market showed that Congress is 
currently not acting in such a fashion.36 The commentators took this issue a 
step further and demonstrated convincingly that the federal government 
cannot currently be expected to act as a rational central planner. Given this, I 
have no problem conceding that at this point "the United States criminal 
justice system has little to gain, and perhaps even much to lose, from addi­
tional federal regulation."37 
Second, since the focus of the discussion here is on the American federal­
state debate, I would like to situate this debate in its appropriate place 
32. Barkow, supra note 6, at 1718. 
33. Teichman, supra note I, at 1866-74. 
34. Id. This does not imply that only federal involvement is desirable. Additional state regu­
lation of the activities of local Jaw enforcement agencies may be useful as well. 
35. Barkow, supra note 6, at 1720-23; Gross, supra note 6, at 1731-32; Logan, supra note 6, 
at 1745-47. 
36. Teichman, supra note I, at 1870-73 (evaluating federal legislation in the area of criminal 
justice in a critical fashion). 
37. Id. at 1874. 
1756 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1749 
vis-a-vis The Market. The Market is not a paper about the relationship be­
tween the federal and state governments in the United States in the context 
of criminal justice. Rather, my analysis of the specific relationship between 
the state and federal governments in the United States with respect to crimi­
nal justice aimed to serve as a mere illustration of a broad theoretical 
framework. The Market offers a way to think about any policy adopted by 
any level of a decentralized government in order to control crime. Issues 
such as the intrastate relationship between counties and the state govern­
ment, the size of sanctions nations adopt with respect to crimes that can 
travel across international lines, immigration policies regarding potential 
felons, and the harmonization of criminal law in Europe as that unification 
process progresses, all fall under the framework of The Market. In the 
American context, as Gross points out, it might be the case that the interest­
ing questions regarding crime displacement and the law lie in the intrastate 
domain between cities and counties, and not in the interstate domain.38 
Having made these preliminary comments, I would like to address sev­
eral of the policy issues raised by the commentators and use this opportunity 
to clarify and extend some of the arguments I made in The Market. Barkow 
focuses her critique on the unique pathologies of the politics of American 
criminal justice. These pathologies, she argues, render the federal govern­
ment a poor central planer. For the most part I find myself in complete 
agreement with Barkow. Yet her analysis does raise several side issues. First, 
while the institutional analysis she presents is important, a substantive the­
ory of the goals of legislation is important as well. The Market offers 
policymakers a clear benchmark in order to evaluate crime control legisla­
tion enacted by Congress. For instance, it allows the critic to explain 
precisely what is wrong with federal legislation that imposes harsh minimal 
standards on states.39 Second, a specific subset of policymakers that could 
find the ideas of The Market useful in making decisions are federal judges. 
As Barkow and I agree, the federal courts could serve a useful role in curb­
ing the trend of increasing harshness in American criminal justice.40 
Understanding the role of the federal government as a central planner of 
crime control can assist federal judges in interpreting legal terms such as 
"cruel and unusual punishment" and "legitimate state interest." Finally, 
Barkow's analysis is extremely useful in the sense that it is pragmatic and 
takes the American criminal justice system as it is, yet in that sense it is also 
path dependent and does not deal with the issue of how an ideal system 
should look. For instance, Barkow points out that the fact that the federal 
government is responsible for prosecuting only a small subset of criminals 
38. Gross, supra note 6, at 1727. 
39. See, e.g., Megan's Law; Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Chil­
dren and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 572, 572 (Jan. 5, 
1999) (noting that "[t]he Wettlerling [sic] Act generally sets out minimum standards for state sex 
offender registration programs"). 
40. Barkow, supra note 6, at 1723 n.46. 
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allows it to use the high sanctioning level it does.41 But if we do not take that 
as a given and ask ourselves how an optimal criminal justice system should 
be structured, we might conclude that crime control (or certain aspects of it) 
should be completely federalized. In that case, the federal government might 
adopt lower sanctions since it simply could not afford its current sanctioning 
level. 
Logan continues the line of thought developed by Barkow and points out 
that, as a practical matter, even a well-intentioned federal government will 
find it difficult to regulate competition in criminal justice.42 This is clearly a 
valid point. The regulation of actors who are competing among themselves 
is a difficult, at times even impossible, task. Once one dimension of compe­
tition is regulated, the parties find nonregulated avenues to compete over. 
Even in a relatively centralized government, regulating local players could 
prove to be a tricky task. In Israel, for instance, crime control is managed by 
the national government.43 This causes local municipalities to shift their 
crime displacement efforts to other avenues. The city of Tel Aviv recently 
invested substantial amounts of money in renovating and illuminating a park 
that became a magnet for drug dealers as a result of crime control efforts in 
a neighboring suburb.44 This, in turn, caused the activity to shift from the 
park to neighboring areas.45 Other Israeli municipalities have overcome the 
lack of a locally controlled police force by hiring private security companies 
that provide them with semi-police services.46 Nonetheless, some forms of 
regulation can be easy to manage. For instance, in the area of SORNLs, the 
federal government could set the maximum duration of public notification 
allowed.47 This is a clear, bright-line rule that the states will find difficult to 
circumvent. The duration of the registration requirement is of importance 
since, as I pointed out elsewhere, indefinite registration might create a prob­
lem of marginal deterrence with respect to sex offenders, 48 to say nothing of 
protecting other values such as forgiveness and rehabilitation. States might 
41. Id. at 1722. In this regard, Barkow also raises the concern that this might cause the fed­
eral government to adopt a strategy of high sanctions coupled with a low probability of detection. 
Unlike Barkow, I am not sure that that is such a bad outcome. See Becker, supra note 4, at 184 
(pointing out the efficiency of raising sanctions while lowering the probability of detection). 
42. Logan, supra note 6, at 1746. 
43. See David Weisburd, Orit Shalev & Menachem Amir, Community Policing in Israel: 
Resistance and Change, 25 POLICING 80, 82 (2002) (describing the structure of the national Israeli 
police force). 
44. Yu val Azulay, Tel Aviv Launches 'Green' Plan to Combat Inner City Drug-Addict 
Colonies, HAARETZ, June 6, 2005, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/objects/pages/ 
PrintArticleEn.jhtml ?itemNo=58462 I. 
45. Id. 
46. The affluent suburb Kefar Shmariahu adopted such a policy. See http://www.kfar.org.il/ 
(describing the suburb's security program). 
4 7. This is contrary to the current situation in which federal legislation sets out minimal 
registration requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (b)(6)(8) (2000) (requiring lifetime registration 
only for certain types of offenders). 
48. Doron Teichman, Sex, Shame, and the Law: An Economic Perspective on Megan's Laws, 
42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 355, 389-91 (2005). 
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not be able to protect such interests and values because of the risk of sex 
offender migration from states with long (at times indefinite) registration 
requirements to states with shorter registration requirements. 
Logan focuses his critique on the reliance of states on the outcomes of 
criminal procedures in other states, what he terms as the external approach. 
In The Market, I endorsed the external approach as a viable way for states to 
shed themselves from unwanted migration triggered by other states' harsh 
criminal laws.49 While Logan raises some interesting concerns as to the use 
of the external approach, these concerns do not undermine the case for its 
use as a tool to overcome some of the collective action problems identified 
in The Market. A central part of Logan's critique of the external approach is 
his concern that it will lead to what he sees as unfair outcomes.50 As he 
points out, an immigrant from a state with harsh registration requirements 
such as South Carolina might have to register as a sex offender in a state that 
adopted the external approach (say Michigan51) in cases in which a resident 
of Michigan who committed an identical crime does not have to register. Yet 
Logan's conclusion that unequal treatment necessarily implies unfairness is 
tenuous since he employs a strictly ex post view of fairness. He implicitly 
assumes that if Michigan did not adopt the external approach everyone 
would be treated equally, and the immigrant from South Carolina would not 
have to register as a sex offender in Michigan. However, once we shift to the 
ex ante point of view, this result does not necessarily hold. Facing sex of­
fender migration from South Carolina due to the harsh legal conditions 
there, Michigan might be compelled to duplicate those conditions in order to 
cut down unwanted migration. Thus, both the immigrant from South Caro­
lina and the native resident of Michigan will have to register. True, Logan's 
world is fair in the sense that everyone is treated equally; but everyone is 
treated more harshly in his world as well. This raises the question: what's so 
fair about fairness? 
Once the ex ante view is adopted, additional problems in Logan's com­
ments emerge. For instance, he argues that adopting the external approach 
will bring about more uniformity in the area of SORNLs, which will un­
dermine legal experimentation in the area.52 The effect of the external 
approach, however, is the exact opposite. The external approach allows for 
more legislative diversity, since states adopting it will be free to legislate 
more lenient SORNLs without being concerned about opportunistic immi­
gration of sex offenders. Not using the external approach, on the other hand, 
will bring about uniformity in the area since states will simply converge to 
the harshest possible standards. 53 Following the argument presented above, 
49. Teichman, supra note I, at 1872-73. 
50. Logan, supra note 6, at 1739-41. 
51. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.723(1)(d) (West 2004). 
52. Logan, supra note 6, at 1742-44. 
53. Logan is also concerned that the external approach will make it difficult to measure the 
efficiency of different policies since the control set will be eliminated. Id. at 1744. Actually, the 
external approach offers many opportunities for those engaged in empirical studies. Rather than 
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the fact that Michigan adopted the external approach allows it to adopt a 
SORNL that is different (and more lenient) than that of South Carolina. 
Logan's concern over the limitation of the freedom of movement caused 
by the external approach seems problematic as well.54 The external approach 
does not penalize an offender for migrating to another state; it simply sus­
tains the same legal regime that he was subject to in his initial place of 
residence. Hence, if an offender wishes to migrate from South Carolina to 
Michigan because of a lucrative job offer, the fact that his registration re­
quirement will follow him only means that he will be indifferent in his 
residence decision from that perspective. If there is social capital to be 
gained from migration, the individual will still migrate. 
Logan continues and raises two intriguing concerns over the effect of the 
external approach on the states' democratic process. Logan argues that the 
external approach allows states to codify harsh legislation from other states 
without a transparent political process.55 As he put it "[t]he external ap­
proach thus permits a kind of stealth legislation."56 This concern seems 
slightly overstated for two reasons. First, it again ignores the ex ante per­
spective that led to the conclusion that the external approach will generally 
allow for more lenient laws. Thus, while the external approach might se­
cretly import to Michigan harsh requirements that will apply to individuals 
migrating to the state, it will also allow for more leniency towards Michigan 
residents. Second, it overlooks the fact that the external approach by defini­
tion applies only to individuals immigrating to the state, which is a rather 
small subset of individuals. Between 1995 and 2000 the interstate migration 
rate was 86.7 per 1,000 residents.57 Thus, this does not seem to be a practical 
way to harshen a state's entire criminal code, and one should not exaggerate 
the concerns arising from it. 
Logan further claims that the external approach is unwarranted since it 
forsakes "the right of states to act autonomously and independently, free of 
the constraining authority of other governmental units."58 This claim over­
looks the fact that even without any federal constraints, states act under a 
different, and at times much more ruthless, constraint: the constraint of the 
market. When actors operate within a competitive setting, their choices 
might be constrained such that they reflect the structure of the setting and 
not their individual choices.59 The Market demonstrates that state legislation 
comparing two sets of criminals in different states with different legal regimes, the external ap­
proach will create within the state two sets of criminals that are subject to different legal regimes. 
Measuring the differences between these two groups will isolate the effect of the legal policy from 
differences attributable to social differences between states. 
54. Id. at 1743. 
55. Id. at 1741-42. 
56. Id. at 1742. 
57. RACHELS. FRANKLIN, DOMESTIC MIGRATION ACROSS REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND STATES: 
1995 TO 2000, at 3 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-7.pdf. 
58. Logan, supra note 6, at 1742. 
59. See generally Debra Satz & John Ferejohn, Rational Choice and Social Theory, 91 J. 
PHIL. 71 (1994). 
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and policies in the area of criminal justice do not necessarily reflect the 
ideal decisions for the state. Rather, they reflect the ideal decisions given the 
competitive pressures arising from other states. I personally, like others writ­
ing from a rational choice perspective, am not inclined to make a fetish of 
federalism.60 At the end of the day the question is an instrumental one. States 
should not have a "right" to engage in harmful competition, and the federal 
government should not be precluded from regulating certain types of state 
behavior merely because it did not do so before.61 
The gap between what states do and what states want to do in the area of 
criminal legislation has doctrinal implications regarding the tendency of 
courts to use comparative legal analysis with respect to criminal law. Courts 
evaluating the constitutionality of criminal sanctions against Eighth 
Amendment challenges routinely engage in a practice of comparative legal 
analysis. According to this analysis, if a large group of states follows a cer­
tain sanctioning practice, then one can deduce that the practice should be 
upheld because there does not exist a national consensus against it.62 The 
implicit assumption in this type of analysis is that one can reach normative 
conclusions from the positive picture one sees. But with jurisdictional com­
petition in the picture, such a connection does not necessarily exist since in 
a competitive setting jurisdictions might be compelled to adopt harsh poli­
cies that are far from ideal.63 
In conclusion, while the policy discussion in this correspondence natu­
rally focuses the attention on the disagreements between my colleagues and 
me, one should take notice of the range of agreement between us as well. 
For the most part, the discussion reflects a methodological consensus as to 
the way the questions raised in The Market should be addressed. Namely, 
we agree that the desired structure of the criminal justice system should be 
analyzed through the lens of the political economy of the different govern­
mental institutions composing it. 
60. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 281 (2d ed. 2001). See generally Ed­
ward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. 
REV. 903 (1994) (presenting an instrumental analysis of federalism). 
61. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 60, at 951 (noting that "[ w ]hen some branch of the national 
government decides to act in a way that displaces state authority, there is no basis for restricting 
such action"). 
62. See, e. g. , Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333-35 (1989) (upholding the death penalty 
for the mentally retarded); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (upholding the death 
penalty for individuals who committed their crimes as juveniles); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 
154 (1987) (upholding Arizona's death penalty for felony murder). Stanford and Penry were later 
abrogated due to a trend among states to eliminate those forms of sanctioning. See Roper v. Sim­
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-68 (2005) (striking down the death penalty for juveniles); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002) (striking down the death penalty for the mentally retarded). 
The trends documented in these two cases stand in opposition to the claim of a general harshening 
in American criminal justice. 
63. Note the difference between the argument 1 make here and the argument I made in The 
Market on the issue of comparative analysis, Teichman, supra note I, at 1869-70. In The Market, I 
argued that a comparative analysis of sanctions might be useful in order to strike down dispropor­
tionately high sanctions. The point I make in the text above is that such analysis should not be made 
in order to uphold a general practice of harsh sanctions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Market ended with a question: is the American criminal justice sys­
tem engaged in a race to the top or a race to the bottom? This 
correspondence demonstrates that answering this question might be a thorny 
task. Criminal law is a complex social phenomenon involving competing, 
and at times contradicting, values. It is difficult to understand, particularly in 
an intricate system such as the American one. Professors Rachel Barkow, 
Sam Gross, and Wayne Logan, each from her or his unique perspective, 
helped us all understand some of these difficulties. Furthermore, at the end 
of this correspondence, one can map out several avenues to continue and 
explore the issues raised here. 
One avenue of research could explore plausible connections between 
mobility and criminal sanctions from a quantitative perspective. As mobility 
becomes easier, the competitive forces identified in The Market will be 
stronger, and jurisdictions will be expected to adjust their policies faster. 
This hypothesis could be explored by comparing jurisdictions that are rela­
tively isolated, such as Hawaii and Alaska, with jurisdictions in which the 
costs of moving are lower. Testing the mobility hypothesis could also focus 
on how the lifting of legal travel restrictions affects the level of criminal 
sanctioning. Notice that as a theoretical matter it is difficult to predict the 
precise effect of such changes, and one must distinguish between short-term 
and long-term changes in the level of sanctions. While in the long run, com­
petition generated by a decentralized criminal justice system is expected to 
drive sanctions upward, the short-term effect of decentralization might actu­
ally be the reduction of sanctions by some local jurisdictions. If at the initial 
point the units operated in isolation (think of Europe for example), then 
once travel restrictions are lifted and criminals are free to cross borders, the 
units with higher sanctions might see an immediate reduction in their crime 
rates, since local criminals will travel to the more lenient jurisdictions. This, 
in tum, will allow the harsher jurisdictions to lower their sanctions (while 
the lenient jurisdictions will face higher crime rates and raise their sanc­
tions). Nonetheless, after the initial reduction, long term competition will 
still drive all jurisdictions to raise sanctions. As is evident from this point, 
the precise hypothesis generated by The Market could be rich and complex, 
depending on the unique circumstances of each situation. 
More qualitative work could also further our understanding of the issues at 
hand. Closely examining the selection of cases made by prosecutors might 
shed light on the role of displacement in applying prosecutorial discretion. 
Specific case studies of criminal legislation could flesh out the political forces 
driving the enactment of new criminal legislation. Note, for example, that the 
Texas legislation aimed against the sale of pseudoephedrine was initiated by a 
state senator representing a county bordering Oklahoma.64 To the extent that 
this is a common phenomenon, such studies could help us understand the 
64. Under the Dome, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 11, 2005, at SA (reporting on a bill 
introduced by Senator Estes from Wichita Falls, Texas). 
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politics of criminal legislation. By using methodological tools-including 
interviews, media surveys, and close examinations of legislative history­
they might help explain some of the complicated causation issues that quan­
titative studies cannot fully address. 
